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n 1959, when their chief prophet, the British 
socialist G D H Cole died, associationalist 
ideas looked dead too. The future still be­
longed to big corporations, large-scale mass 
production and efficient managerialism. Na­
tional economic management would ensure steady 
growth, secure in an international regime of fixed 
exchange rates and free trade. The dominant logic 
of industrial organisation was standardised mass 
production, utilising capital-intensive special pur­
pose machinery and predominantly unskilled or 
semi-skilled workers to produce long runs of stand­
ardised goods. Manual workers enjoyed in the
main low autonomy and identified but little with 
the enterprise or its goals. The archetypical mod­
em industrial employee was the alienated assem­
bly-line worker. Mass production conferred com­
petitive advantage on the large corporation that 
could fully exploit economies of scale and acquire 
a sufficient share of the market so as to be invul­
nerable to competition from all but a few compa­
rable firms.
This world was shattered in the early 1970s. 
At the level of the international economy, four 
major changes occurred at an accelerating rate 
from the late 1960s onwards, and had become
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well-established by the 1980s.
•  The stable and fixed exchange rates that 
were the primary object of international mon­
etary policy in the Bretton Woods system broke 
down when the US dollar ceased to be convert­
ible into gold in 1972, and, therefore, could no 
longer act as the linchpin of the system. The 
result was to promote the internationalisation of 
currency markets and intensify speculative deal­
ing in them, leading to volatility and uncertainty 
in exchange rates.
•  Financial deregulation in the 1980s strongly 
reinforced the trend toward the internationalisa­
tion and interlinking of the major equity mar­
kets—London, New York and Tokyo are linked 
by continuous interactive trading and the ex­
changes are vulnerable to rapid movements of 
large volumes of footloose capital.
•  Supra-national economic and trading 
blocs—the two most important being the Euro­
pean Community and NAFTA (including the 
USA, Canada and Mexico)—were formed.
•The volume of trade in manufactured goods 
between the advanced industrial economies dra­
matically increased. Most markets for major in­
dustrial products are now international and ma­
jor industrial economies now both export and 
import significant proportions of such goods, 
whereas before the 1960s home-sourcing was 
dominant and export markets between the maj or 
industrial nations were specialised.
The result of these developments has been a 
rapid change in the nature of competitive pres­
sures and the forms of industrial organisation that 
are appropriate to respond to them. Growth in 
the international economy has become more 
volatile and uncertain. Markets for manufac­
tured goods are now internationalised, less ho­
mogenous and less predictable, and firms are 
confronted with changing patterns of demand on 
a world scale and the complex differentiation of 
local markets. This has dramatically undercut the 
previously dominant company strategies of mass 
production for steadily growing and standardised 
mass markets. Hence it has been more difficult for 
firms to exploit long runs or to enjoy major 
economies of scale in manufacturing.
The most obvious consequence of these de­
velopments since the 1970s is that Keynesian 
strategies for national economic management 
have failed to maintain their effectiveness in the 
face of both the internationalisation of the main 
macroeconomic variables and their increasing 
volatility. Another obvious consequence is that a 
centralised national industrial policy that aims to 
promote industrial concentration in the interests 
of productive efficiency in exploiting the advan­
tages of economies of scale is also less and less 
effective. Building national champions has less 
and less rationality, as the processes of competi­
tion become more diverse and favour different 
types of firms. The same problems affect a policy 
of ‘picking winners’, of national policy makers 
determining the technologies of the future and 
mobilising both R&D resources and major firms 
to meet them. Technologies are less certain and 
more diverse, and the errors of a centralised 
industrial policy can magnify those of misjudg- 
ment on the part of firms.
The result has been a series of major changes 
in both public policy and economic organisation, 
as states and firms have both had to adapt to new 
forms of production, responding to seeking strat­
egies that cope with uncertain and turbulent 
markets. Public governance of the economy is by 
no means entirely defeated by such changes; 
rather, adaptive advantage has shifted to new 
institutions and forms of economic management. 
There have been major changes in forms of 
organisation and policy in the post-1973 period.
The first is a shift from ‘Fordist’ standardised 
mass production to new manufacturing strategies 
that emphasise productive flexibility—1 shall use 
Michael Piore and Charles Sahel's concept of 
‘flexible specialisation’ to describe these changes 
in preference to the variety of other labels on 
offer. Flexible specialisation is production for 
changing and differentiated markets, that require 
diverse quantities of varied goods over relatively 
short periods of time. It can be defined as the 
production of a changing range of customised or 
semi-customised goods by broadly-skilled work­
ers with a substantial measure of autonomy using 
general-purpose machinery. The production proc­
ess can adapt rapidly to different compositions of 
output through the skills of its workers and the 
responsiveness of its management structure.
Many firms have had to learn the conse­
quences of this shift in the condition of effective 
competition the hard way, and the larger and the 
more committed they have been to large-scale 
standardised production the more difficult it has 
been for them to adapt. Firms like General Mo­
tors in the USA have tried to introduce elements 
of flexibility into their lines and product ranges, 
to win deals for more flexible working patterns 
with unions, and to flatten their management 
hierarchies to make them more responsive, lay­
ing off whole levels of middle management and 
routine administration.
Small and medium-sized firms, far from being 
confined to marginal niches or merely being the 
subcontractors of the subsidiaries of larger ones, 
have taken on a new lease of life in these changed 
conditions. In many sectors they can exploit 
significant niche markets or product areas unsuit­
able to large firms, however flexible and diversi­
fied the latter may be.
Such firms are most effective and competitive 
when they are to be found in industrial districts—
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that is, constellations of firms in the same or 
related or complementary industries that typi­
cally share a common regional location. Such 
districts are highly diverse in their organisation 
but the most effective ones are those where firms 
have some ongoing collective and co-operative 
form of organisation, and where that organisa­
tion enters into partnership with a public body. 
Industrial districts provide firms with the equiva­
lents of economies of scale in the provision of 
many key inputs and capital goods.
Industrial districts and the scale-mirroring 
advantages of collective services show that social 
governance of the economy has not collapsed, 
but that it has shifted in emphasis from national 
management of macroeconomic aggregates to 
the regional level and to the orchestration of co­
operation and the provision of facilities by re­
gional public agencies. Regional government has 
grown in salience partly because industrial dis­
tricts tend to be clustered in this way, but also 
because this level of government has certain 
definite advantages in the new economic situa­
tion. Regional governments are of a scale where 
it is more possible for them to know in some detail 
the capacities of local industries and firms; they 
can develop, in Alfred Marshall’s words, an ‘inti­
mate knowledge’ of what they most regulate and 
sustain. They can both make well-informed deci­
sions and seek consent from those prominent 
members of local firms and trade association 
leaders known to them. Regional governments 
also tend to be concerned with the success of 
local industry, with the pragmatic ends of local 
wealth and local employment, far more than with 
the ideological goals that national governments 
or major interest organisations frequently pursue.
The nation state, however, is far from losing 
all capacity in economic governance. Nation 
states remain political communities, and many 
have and will retain extensive powers to influ­
ence and sustain economic actors within their 
territories. Even within a strongly developed trade 
bloc like the EC, national states will have key 
economic integrative functions and they will 
retain military, cultural and legal functions and 
powers that are specific to them and give them 
certain capacities of economic intervention and 
regulation and that both the trade bloc and the 
region lack. Even if the technical powers of 
national economic management have declined 
with the internationalisation of key variables, 
the political role of government is still important, 
but as the facilitator and orchestratorof commit­
ments by economic actors. The national state 
remains effective if it can draw upon and rein­
force bases of co-operation and consensus among 
social actors. The national state has three key 
functions in this respect:
• It must construct and sustain a distribu­
tional coalition, that is, an acceptance by the key 
economic actors and the organised social inter­
ests representing them of an ongoing distribution 
of national income and state expenditure that 
promotes economic effectiveness generally and 
competitive manufacturing performance in par­
ticular.
• Such a coalition will only be sustained if the 
state gives ongoing and active attention to an­
other function, the orchestration of social con­
sensus. Such coalitions can only be sustained in a 
collaborativepolitical culture in which the major 
organised interests accept both the need to co­
operate and the primacy of the nation, that they 
view the nation as a community of fate in which 
they share success or failure. Consensus does not 
imply the absence of conflicts of interest, rather 
that a balance be struck between co-operation 
and competition, and that the national state acts 
as a medium wherein specific resource allocation 
mechanisms, such as the system of wage determi­
nation and the operation of capital markets are 
able to operate effectively.
• The national state needs to achieve an 
effective distribution of its fiscal resources and its 
regulatory activities between the national, re­
gional and local levels of government. Those 
national states are most effective that can give 
autonomy to and sustain the kind of regional 
governments that promote local industry. Na­
tional states are thus effective when they are 
either the constitutional architects of decentrali­
sation or where they at least tolerate a de facto 
federalism in economic governance.
Organised labpurhasthe strongest interest in 
continuing and in promoting such consensus 
policies at national level. Labour is collectively 
less mobile than capital and must regard its na­
tional situations as a community of fate. Thus 
where organised labour is cohesive enough and 
can adopt the appropriate policies of restraint in 
its demands, it can offer the conditions for an 
ongoing pact with employers. Where employers 
have the minimum of solidarity and the national 
commitment to respond, then the conditions are 
created for an effective economic partnership of 
the major social interests. Organised labor has to 
accept responsibility in wage bargaining, a com­
mitment to improve productivity and tax levels 
on wages high enough to support infrastructure 
spending. These commitments are difficult to 
sustain on the part of organised labour, even 
where a strong social democratic tradition and 
the inheritance of the appropriate structure of 
industrial relations institutions makes this possi­
ble. Effective corporatist bargaining continues to 
be a means of achieving economic stabilisation in 
a post-keynesian period, but it is exceedingly 
fragile, subject to default by self-interested sec­
tions of business and workers alike.
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The combination of increasingly socially frag­
mented but geographically localised labour and 
internationally footloose capital does not bode 
well for national-level corporatist economic gov­
ernance. One cannot comfortably rely on ex­
ploiting existing legacies of solidarity and social 
democratic representation to offer employers a 
responsible workforce, a bargain they cannot 
refuse. The way has to be found to a new system 
of national interest representation, one that is 
differentiated enough to be inclusive of the more 
diverse economic interests in modem society and 
yet that is cohesive enough to promote co-opera­
tion rather than self-seeking conflict and lobby­
ing. A new kind of corporatist concertation might 
be based firstly on processes of co-operation at 
regional level and secondly on the bargaining of 
regional and industry representatives at national 
leveLThis would be different from the present 
system where these industries and regions are not 
represented separately but through the interests 
of the participants in them as either employer or 
worker.
Associative structures thus offer a way for­
ward in co-ordination through corporate social 
governance. The spread of co-operative and 
mutual ownership would tend to reduce the cur­
rent gap between the wage worker, who sees the 
firm as a mere means to earn a living, and the 
manager, who acts as a steward of external pro­
viders of capital. Both would have distinct posi­
tions but common interests in an ongoing, self- 
governing association. Such forms of ownership 
would also help to facilitate the regional collabo­
ration of firms and public-private partnerships. 
Labour would thus be united with the enterprise 
and capital would be rooted in the locality, rather 
than vanishing into the internalised market. New 
forms of capital made possible through co-opera­
tive and mutual ownership of enterprises and new 
types of financial institutions, such as regional 
industrial savings banks or industrial credit un­
ions, would mean that capital funds would tend 
to be recycled regionally and invested in local 
work and wealth. An economy in which mutual 
institutions predominated would tend to localise 
basic capital and, hence, require less regional 
redistribution in the long run, because output and 
employment would be more evenly distributed 
between regions.
The aim of an associative reform process 
would be to move toward an economy in which 
small- and medium-sized enterprises are more 
salient than at present, where ownership is firmly 
rooted within a locality, where capital is pre­
dominantly raised within the region, and where 
collective services and economic regulation are 
provided by public-private partnerships between 
trade associations and the regional government. 
Smaller enterprises are more easily subjected to
democratic governance by their own members 
and community representatives. The argument 
here is not against large-scale per se, neither 
claiming that ‘small is beautiful’, nor holding that 
local relations are inherently less alienating than 
long-distance or international ones. Small enter­
prises can be viciously exploitative and authori­
tarian, as any half observant visitor to a sweat­
shop will testify. The local can be the merely 
provincial. Sometimes, moreover, the large-scale 
is necessary.
The reason for decentralisation, in both state 
economic management and the structures of firms, 
is that this makes for both more informed and 
more accountable decision making. If the future 
belongs to quality, in both the products and in the 
lives skilled and individuated economic agents 
demand, then it can only be had by intimate 
knowledge of the processes whereby products are 
made and of the people who produce them. 
Management that lives by accounting data and 
the short-term is less and less effective in the 
competitive business of selling goods. It remains 
rife in sectors where service ought to be the 
primary goal—in public health, education and 
welfare agencies.
The concern for quality is in essence the 
belief that firms will only prosper by offering a 
genuine service through the goods they sell. Japa­
nese management in the most successful compa­
nies does believe in offering service, and it has 
managed to get large enterprises to behave like 
small ones. In part this is because these enter­
prises do depend on small ones. Major Japanese 
companies have been able to reduce inventories 
through ‘just-in-time’ sourcing of components 
and have been able to enter into partnerships 
with allied firms to develop a continuous upgrad­
ing of components. This has been achieved by 
developing an ongoing social relation with sup­
pliers through relational sub-contractors. This is 
a system in which a supplier by offering service to 
the bigger firm is rewarded by an ongoing rela­
tionship based on trust, where the supplier will 
receive information, advice and even capital 
investment to meet the demands of quality. That 
relationship is complex, open-ended and not 
‘transparent’; rather it is based on the exchange of 
knowledge through trust.
In countries like Britain, the US and Aus­
tralia, of course, these sorts of relationships have 
developed only sporadically, if at all, and far- 
reaching regeneration is desperately needed. The 
most obvious kind of regeneration not to proceed 
with in this context is dirigiste central govern­
ment industrial policy to be able to ‘pick winners’ 
with the aid of the country’s big firms. The 
government ought to facilitate local economic 
action by appropriate permissive laws and by 
assistance of an appropriate kind:
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•  to build up a network of mutual capital 
providers through appropriate tax incentives— 
such bodies would be non-profit making indus­
trial investment banks fora region or industry. If 
building societies can succeed in attracting citi­
zens’ savings to finance housing through suitable 
tax concessions to investors, then the same can 
be done for industrial credit banks and with far 
more more urgent need;
•  to encourage public-private partnerships in 
the major regions (in advance of formal struc­
tures of regional government) in order to pro­
mote training, technology transfer, collective 
services, etc;
•  to give priority in the structure of tax 
allowances to companies for investment in manu­
facturing, with special incentives for companies 
with less than 1000 employees in particular;
•  to give incentives to co-operatives, labour- 
capital partnerships and other forms of employee 
involvement in firms’ ownership and govern­
ance, such as employee share ownership plans;
•  to promote competition, discourage merg­
ers and encourage firms to decentralise and to 
contract out as many operations as possible to 
associative tenderers.
Such policies will take time to act, but a 
failing country’s industries can only be effectively 
rebuilt relatively slowly by effort and enterprise, 
not by ministry fiat or ‘national plans’. Given the 
right incentives, even in a far from propitious 
macroeconomic climate, the associative and 
small-to-medium-sized sector would begin to ex­
pand and to do so in places hitherto without hope 
of seeing firms opening again in manufacturing 
except through regional subsidies.
The associative conception of the economy 
need not be parochial nor need it reject innova­
tion and investment in new technologies. The 
Japanese township of Sakaki is an excellent ex­
ample of a small industrial district that continues 
intensely local economic loyalties with produc­
tion of goods like medical testing equipment and 
for international markets. The great advantage of 
associative ideas is that they can accommodate a 
wide variety of types and objectives of economic 
institutions: it is not tied to a single model of 
enterprise like the large hierarchically-managed 
mass-production firms.
An associative dimension to the economy is 
not being proposed here entirely for extra-eco­
nomic reasons, such as that full democratic ac­
countability requires the diffusion of ownership 
aHd an end to hierarchical authority in civil 
society. These are far from intrinsically bad rea­
sons for seeking associative reform, but such 
changes will not be popularly accepted if they are 
held to involve less economic efficiency and 
produce less wealth. The argument here is that 
associative structures are in line with major
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changes in economic organisation, which favour 
quality products and skilled workers with some 
autonomy. Such changes mean that 
associationalism is a social route to economic 
efficiency, just as flexible specialisation is an 
organisational route to industrial efficiency.
At the same time, the danger of an interna­
tional economy increasingly dominated by major 
hierarchically-governed transnational corpora­
tions is not inconsiderable; were such an economy 
to develop, then effective regulation and govern­
ance of markets by regions or nations would 
become impossible. Such global companies would 
try to square their top-down authority with in­
volvement by, and identification for, their own 
members, particularly as all operations could not 
be run from a global head office. Firms would try 
to compensate for the effects of markets within 
their own structures, but would leave all without 
to the mercy of largely unregulated market com­
petition. Governments would become mere mu­
nicipalities providing local services. Assoc­
iationalism offers a coherent answer to such prob­
lems and explains how we can compensate for the 
relative decline of the capacities of national 
economic management and, at the same time, 
preserve the community relationships that peo­
ple continue unreservedly to desire. An associa­
tive economy would encourage people to set up 
in business for themselves, as self-employed arti­
sans or traders, or in very small firms (up to ten 
employees). It would make capital easier to ob­
tain for the small firm or partnership, provided 
employees were encouraged to join in through 
co-ownership schemes and participating man­
agement rules. Such a society would be attractive 
to those who do not like to be regimented, and 
quite unlike schemes built upon compulsory ‘par­
ticipation’ in large enterprises under the illusory 
rhetoric of ‘workers’ control’.
An economy in which associative forms of 
organisation came to predominate would sys­
tematise those processes of public-private co­
operation and co-ordination that already exist in 
the best-organised industrial districts and also 
generalise them across the society. The wider 
economy would gain all the benefits of regulatory 
decentralisation and the trust-based relationships 
characteristic of such well-governed districts. But 
the associative democratic basis of such eco­
nomic institutions would add something else, the 
means to reduce conflict and to make co-opera­
tion easier. Self-governing enterprises that were 
more accountable to their members would tend 
to reduce the conflicts that have their locus in 
authoritarian structures and status differences 
within firms, conflicts that are the basis for the 
institutionalised divisions between workers and 
managers in political organisations. Also as 
associational forms permit pluralism, there would
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be ample scope for different types of firms and 
different types of local public-private relations. 
The result would be to diffuse and decentralise 
the interests that lead to conflict. Civil society 
would be more open-textured and less dominated 
than it is now by big companies, big unions, and 
their respective political organisations. The re­
sult of such diffusion would be to make collabora­
tion between enterprises and the public power 
less problematic, and, therefore, to ensure an 
ongoing dialogue between them.
There is no one best model of how to govern 
an industrial district, but there are some lessons 
that can be learned from existing districts. The 
aim of an industrial public sphere must be to 
concretise that industrial atmosphere that Alfred 
Marshall found the moving force of industrial 
districts like South East Lancashire in his Industry 
and Trade (1920). An industrial public sphere is 
an open-textured set of interconnecting net­
works and institutions to which all economic 
actors concerned are free to contribute. It is more 
general than specific contractural or co-opera­
tive relationships between firms, that may be 
closed in access for mutual advantage, or the 
provision of services by a public authority, which 
may involve some element of administrative dis­
cretion. It provides the context for more specific 
co-ordinative governance through the provision 
of collective services, local sources of investment 
finance, activities organised by trade associations 
and labour unions, and ongoing partnerships be­
tween firms. It requires either a sponsor or an 
obvious point of constellation between networks 
and activities. At the most formal that might be 
a corporatist forum, a regional economic cham­
ber, underwritten by the regional government, 
and into which more local or industry-specific 
bodies channel their own networks and forms.
A region linked in this way has a centre in 
which the shape of the local economy and its 
problems can be discussed. Discussion can lead to 
local legislation, to public provision or co­
ordinated action. An industrial public sphere 
turns a district from a series of co-present firms 
and networks in a district into a body capable of 
prevision and remedial action. It can mobilise 
support for the public financing of industry intel­
ligence, market research and collective R&D. It 
would make the economies of regions resilient 
and tenacious, organised bodies capable of re­
sponding to new competitive pressures and pre­
venting decline through remedial action. A pub­
lic sphere is not an administrative machine, nor 
is it a state agency. It is neither public nor private 
and, above all, it is a means for circulating infor­
mation and a forum for discussion.
Regional economic governance will work for 
certain dimensions of policy but not forall. Hence 
the need for a distribution of governance func­
tions between different levels of authority and 
the means to keep each level exclusively to its 
particular functions and to make it accountable 
to those below it. This is the essence of the 
principle of federation and the logic of subsidiarity. 
However, in economic governance a complex 
division of labour is necessary and must be ad- 
j usted over time to meet changing circumstances. 
Associationalism, because it is committed both 
to the federal principle and to the self-govern­
ment of the units of any federated authority, can 
adapt to the new internationalised economic 
environment more easily than many traditional 
doctrines of economic governance.
This account has tried to claim a good deal for 
the capacity of associative reforms to regenerate 
economic activity, that by enhancing the struc­
ture of social governance of the economy it would 
promote those forms of non-market co-ordina­
tion and co-operation that are essential to sustain 
market performance. At the same time one need 
not claim too much for associationalism. It will 
not solve every economic problem, nor will it 
produce instant results. Associationalism is part 
supplement and part substitute. How much it is of 
either depends on political feasibility and on the 
extent to which such reforms are required. 
Associationalist reform is, in fact, better adapted 
to be applied in an evolutionary and incremental 
form, rather than as a ‘big bang’ of change that 
relies primarily on compulsory state legislation 
and administrative action.
Associationalism seeks to create a ‘civil soci­
ety’ properly so called, in which the division 
between the public and the private spheres is 
transformed, in which governance extends be­
yond the state into the wider society, and in 
which the centralisation and hierarchical direc­
tion of the state are reduced to the bare mini­
mum. In such a ‘civil society’ individual rights 
and the principle of choice are protected, the 
blurring of the public-private division does not 
lead to greater state compulsion or intrusion into 
the private realm. At the same time, the capacity 
of society to govern itself, through co-operation 
and through participation in voluntary associa­
tions, is enhanced. Greater economic govern­
ance is possible without an extension of the 
powers of the ‘sovereign state’ and its bureau­
cratic agencies. Thus associationalism offers all 
the political advantages economic liberals claim 
for the market, but with far fewer of the co- 
ordinative problems of social injustices that weakly 
regulated markets produce. ■
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